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Abstract. We analyze two core models of economic development in emerging markets: socialism (i.e., 
the “visible hand” of the state in directing the country’s socio-economic life) and capitalism (i.e., the 
“invisible hand” of the markets implemented through pro-market reforms). We further distinguish 
between two types of socialist economic development: Soviet Communism (as experienced in the pre-
1990s Central and Eastern European transition economies) and Fabian Socialism (as experienced 
in pre-1991 India). We then suggest that companies can adapt to the evolution from socialism to 
capitalism in their countries through the implementation of more sophisticated marketing strategies 
that can ensure a sustainable competitive advantage. Thus, we study the marketing strategies of 
companies from emerging markets operating under both models of economic development. We analyze 
the opportunities and challenges that emerging market companies face under each model of economic 
development in terms of deploying various marketing strategies, and provide useful venues for future 
research. 
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1. Introduction
How has the economic development of emerging markets over time affected their 
companies’ marketing strategies? From an economic development perspective, this is 
an important and timely research question as it highlights the opportunities and threats 
that the external institutional environment presents to companies from emerging 
markets. Emerging markets are “low-income, rapid-growth countries using economic 
liberalization as their primary engine of growth” (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 
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2000, p. 249). Economic growth is pivotal for countries’ competitiveness and success 
in the global arena (for a general overview of the literature on economic development, 
see Baumol, Litan, & Schramm, 2009; Naude, 2011; and Perkins, Radelet, & Lindauer, 
2013). “[I]t is only through growth that people’s living standards… can improve” 
(Baumol et al., 2009, p. 25).
There are two broad approaches to economic development that countries pursued 
in the 20th century: capitalism and socialism (Kornai, 2000; Rapley, 1996). While 
capitalism involves the “invisible hand” of market-based economic liberalization, 
socialism encompasses the “visible hand” of state-led intervention in and planning of 
the country’s economy (Inoguchi & Newman, 1998, p. 134). Economic liberalization 
includes the implementation of government policies that aim to open up the domestic 
economy to foreign competition, stabilize the country’s macro-economic indicators, 
and privatize enterprise ownership so as to stimulate the development of a private sector 
(Henisz, Zelner, & Guilllen, 2005; Williamson, 1990, 2004). Such government policies 
have been referred to as pro-market reforms, structural adjustment policies, or the 
Washington Consensus, as they were supported by the IMF and the World Bank, both 
based in Washington, D.C. (Cuervo-Cazurra & Dau, 2009; Williamson, 1990, 2004). 
Such a pro-capitalist form of economic development has been pursued by emerging 
market governments since the early 1990s in the hope of catching up economically with 
their advanced market counterparts, e.g., the U.S., Western Europe, or Japan (Rapley, 
1996).
As economies evolve, underpinned by pro-market reforms, marketing increasingly 
becomes a core activity for the firm. This centrality of marketing is based on three 
features of an economy adopting pro-market reforms: one, that consumer needs are 
paramount, and that a firm needs to understand and respond to consumer needs; two, 
that firms will increasingly operate in a competitive environment wherein competitors 
will also seek to understand and satisfy customers; and three, consumers will have 
choices in deciding which firm to patronize. Accordingly, firms will find themselves 
under pressure to differentiate from competitors in a bid to win the customer’s loyalty. 
Hence, marketing represents a critical capability that companies need to develop and 
deploy successfully within the evolving institutional environment. In fact, marketing 
has been argued to be of even greater importance to firms than R&D or operational 
capabilities (Krasnikov & Jayachandran, 2008).  
Prior to the initiation of pro-market reforms, many emerging markets had had a 
history of state-led economic development. The state-led economic development 
model involved the state becoming an active “agent of social transformation” (Rapley, 
1996, p. 1) through various socialist policies. These socialist policies were pursued to 
different extents depending on the initial economic conditions of the emerging market: 
i.e., whether the countries were transition economies or (post-colonialist) developing 
countries (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Rapley, 1996). Transition economies are “countries 
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in Central and Eastern Europe that had a central planning regime until 1990 but since 
then have begun moving toward a market-based economy with weakened bureaucratic 
control and widespread private ownership” (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006, p. 659). 
Developing countries were at different stages of economic development at their start 
of pro-market reforms. They are typically defined as the “fast growing and liberalizing” 
countries in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East (Hosskisson et al., 2000, 
p. 249). Thus, the socialist regime in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries 
experienced a more extreme version of socialism, often referred to as State Socialism 
or Soviet Communist or central planning, than developing countries like India, whose 
socialist version was referred to as Fabian Socialism (Desai & Bhagwati, 1975; Kornai, 
1992; Rapley, 1996).
While these institutional changes have been unfolding over time, we know less 
about how local companies have been adjusting to these major shifts in economic 
development, especially in terms of their marketing strategies. Accordingly, the goal 
of our paper is to analyze how the economic transformation of emerging markets 
toward increasingly capitalist model of development over time has affected their 
companies’ marketing strategies. We aim to make the following three key contributions 
to the literature on economic development and marketing strategies of companies from 
emerging markets. 
First, we analyze the co-evolution between the changing institutional environment 
in the emerging markets and companies’ use of various marketing strategies to adapt 
to these institutional changes over time. Thus, our focus is on how the economic 
development model of the emerging market impacts the existence and implementation 
of firms’ marketing strategies. This complements prior research that has focused 
on analyzing how marketing affects firm performance (e.g., Appiah-Adu, 1999; 
Krasnikov & Jayachandran, 2008; Luo, Sivakumar, & Liu, 2005) and supports superior 
performance (e.g., Chari & David, 2012).
Second, prior research has focused on analyzing the relationship between marketing 
and firm performance mostly under the countries’ capitalist period of economic 
development (e.g., Appiah-Adu, 1999; Chari & David, 2012). Thus, little remains known 
about the relevant marketing strategies of emerging market firms prior to the start of 
pro-market reforms. Accordingly, we complement this prior research by analyzing how 
the institutional environment both before the start of pro-market reforms (i.e., the 
socialist period of economic development) and after the start of pro-market reforms 
(i.e., the capitalist period of economic development) affects firms’ marketing strategies. 
Third, in so doing, we also contribute to the literature by distinguishing explicitly 
between two models of socialist economic development: Soviet Communism (as 
experienced in the pre-1990s CEE transition economies) and Fabian Socialism 
(as experienced in the pre-1991 India). We further explore to what extent the local 
companies operating under each of these two socialist models implemented marketing 
strategies to meet the needs of their consumers. 
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In the following sections, we first review the two broad types of economic 
development in emerging markets—socialism and capitalism—and then review how 
each type of economic development has affected the marketing strategies of local 
companies. We illustrate the firm-level effects of the socialist and capitalist models of 
economic development with examples from local companies. 
2. Two Core Models of Economic Development in Emerging Markets 
Socialism and capitalism are the two core models of economic development 
(Alexander, 1967; Inoguchi & Newman, 1998; Kornai, 2000; Rapley, 1996). They have 
been identified as “two competing visions of development policy—one that trusts the 
state, the other that trusts freedom” (Dorn, 1998, p. 3). Within the socialist model, 
we distinguish between the Soviet-style communist model of socialism and the less 
intrusive models of socialism found in many developing countries. In particular, we 
focus on comparing the socialist model in the pre-1990s CEE transition economies 
with that of a key developing country, India, prior to its start of pro-market reforms in 
1991. We then compare these two types of socialism to the capitalist model of economic 
development adopted in India after the start of pro-market reforms in 1991. We follow 
this discussion with how the type of economic development model adopted by the 
emerging market government influenced the marketing strategies of local companies 
operating in these emerging markets during these historical periods. We summarize 
these two broad models of economic development—socialism and capitalism—and 
the distinction between Soviet Communism and Fabian Socialism as two forms of 
socialism, in Table 1, elaborating on each of these next.
The Soviet Communism model of economic development in the pre-1990s  
CEE transition economies
The Soviet model of economic development used central planning based on the 
philosophies of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin (Napier & Thomas, 2004). The ex-ante 
goal of Soviet communism was “to avoid the vagaries of a boom-and-bust market-based 
system” such as, e.g., the Great Depression in the Western economies, “which could 
harm workers’ livelihoods and affect employment predictability” (Napier & Thomas, 
2004, p. 25). Thus, Soviet communism aimed to achieve basic economic security for 
the majority of the population, which put a greater emphasis on the collective and 
minimized the importance of the individual interests. 
The CEE transition economies adopted this philosophy of the Soviet-style socialist 
model of economic development at different points in time. For instance, while 
countries like Bulgaria and Hungary became communist in 1948, other countries in 
the former Soviet Union adopted communism as early as 1918 (Cata, 1998, p. 300). 
Across these countries, three key features characterized the Soviet-style communism: 
an “undivided political power of the ruling party” (Napier & Thomas, 2004, p. 17), state 
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ownership of key elements of the economy, and bureaucratic coordination (Kornai, 
1992). The single-party system set the formal legal constraints and norms of human 
behavior. “The Communist Party and the state were interwoven in a way that insured 
that the party was the dominant force in their common activities” (Napier & Thomas, 
2004, p. 18). The state controlled most key sectors of the economy, especially the 
heavy industry, by nationalizing enterprises and transforming them into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). In some CEE countries, however, some minimal private ownership 
was allowed: e.g., agricultural cooperatives or small family businesses. Lastly, the 
bureaucratic coordination ensured that there was a “strong vertical coordination of 
central planning,” which resulted in the central government making production and 
sales decisions on behalf of individual enterprises.
While the ex-ante goals of the Soviet model of economic development were social 
and economic stability, self-sufficiency and independence from foreign economic 
uncertainties, the ex-post effects assumed a different, albeit unintended, direction. Over 
time, the three core elements outlined above led to underdeveloped product and factor 
(labor and capital) markets across the CEE countries during this period. 
With respect to the product market, SOEs had to fulfil government quotas and adopt 
prices for their products as set by the central government (Kornai, 1980). The state also 
failed to provide sufficient raw materials for the production of the designated products. 
The production of consumer goods was not a priority, as the State emphasized the 
development of the heavy industry. Thus, chronic shortages of consumer products of 
generally low quality were typical under Soviet communism. “The sense of satisfaction 
a consumer derived in obtaining a product, often after queuing all day long, frequently 
was dissipated by it not being the product the buyer originally wanted” (Napier & 
Thomas (2004, p. 23).
With respect to the labor market, the Soviet-style of communist development 
emphasized the importance of full employment and strong education (Kriauciunas 
& Kale, 2006). Both were perceived as necessary to support the growing Soviet 
economy with people with high skills and knowledge. Accordingly, individuals’ 
choices of education were channeled toward developing technical skills such as, e.g., 
engineering. Workers could not be fired easily for underperforming. Workers were also 
paid according to the principle “to everybody according to his work” and “equal pay for 
equal work” (Kornai, 1980, p. 149). Thus, personal initiative-taking and responsibility 
were discouraged in favor of keeping “a low profile” and following state orders (Puffer, 
1994). This led to severe labor market problems such as absenteeism from work (Pearce, 
1991). 
Lastly, with respect to the capital market, the Soviet-style of communist development 
led to the softening of the budget constraints. The state frequently came to the rescue 
by paying the excess expenses over the companies’ earnings (Kornai, 1986). The state 
used different mechanisms to soften the budget constraint: e.g., special subsidies, tax 
exemptions, or favorable bank terms. SOEs were not expected to be profit-maximizers; 
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in fact, profit was perceived as immoral and clashing with the socialist ethics of equality 
for everyone. SOEs were expected to maximize the welfare of their workers and that of 
the state as the key stakeholders.
The Fabian Socialism model of economic development in pre-1991 India
The socialist model of economic development in developing countries in Asia, Africa, 
Latin America, and the Middle East was, in general, less restrictive than the one in 
the CEE transition economies. In these countries, state intervention in the economy 
followed an import substitution path, whereby the state engaged in protectionist 
policies to limit imports and help local industries take off (Rapley, 1996). We focus 
on India’s experience with such socialist economic development, as a representative of 
an alternative approach to developing a socialist economic system, particularly given 
the current importance of India as a key emerging market in the modern global arena 
(Chari & David, 2012). 
Prior to its pro-market reforms in 1991, India underwent a period of its own version 
of socialism. It combined features of the Soviet central planning and the principles of 
the British Fabian Society1 (Desai & Bhagwati, 1975; Milburn, 1958). Thus, India’s 
version of socialism aimed to promote community ownership of the different factors of 
production but while preserving the democratic institutions in the country (Milburn, 
1958). Accordingly, unlike the CEE transition economies which were generally one-
party systems governed by the Communist Party, India preserved its democratic 
political system during its socialist period. The government espoused the “socialist 
industrialization” approach as “the best model for India’s economic development” 
(McKern & Denend, 2005, p. 3). 
Specifically, India implemented the Industrial Policy Resolution, which provided 
majority state control over the country’s infrastructure and other key industries. The 
state also established a Central Planning Commission to execute the country’s five-year 
plans of development. The government subsidized inefficient enterprises, set prices in 
many industries, imposed major restrictions on imports, increased the size of the public 
sector investments, oriented the economy toward heavy industry manufacturing, 
extended the licensing and control of private investments and production, and 
established significant economic relationships with the Soviet Union (Desai & Bhagwati, 
1975; McKern & Denend, 2005). Yet, a key distinction between the Indian version of 
socialism and the Soviet communism in the CEE transition economies was that the 
Indian government did not aim to nationalize existing capital stock. India’s main goal 
was to increase the share of the public sector investment in the overall economy, while 
allowing yet restricting the growth of the private sector capital investments (Desai & 
Bhagwati, 1975). 
1 The Fabian Society originated in Britain in the late 1880s out of concerns of poor worker conditions and 
concentration of wealth in the hands of few (for a detailed overview, see Milburn, 1958). Thus, poverty 
alleviation was at the heart of Fabian Socialism (Milburn, 1958). 
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A prominent feature of the Indian version of socialism between 1947 and 
1991 was the “License Raj” system. The License Raj system put India on a planned 
industrialization path focused on transforming its agrarian economy into a “self-
sufficient industrial state” (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007, p. 544). For this purpose, the Indian 
government consolidated key manufacturing industries under government control. It 
provided special exemptions and tax breaks to state-owned Indian firms to help them 
lead India’s industrial transformation (Elango & Pattnaik, 2007). It also limited foreign 
imports by imposing extensive license and quota requirements on foreign companies 
(Kotwal, Ramaswami, & Wadhwa, 2011). Additionally, the Indian government divided 
industries into three types (Soo, 2008). The first type involved industries under the 
exclusive regulation of the government. The second type involved industries that 
were to become progressively state-owned. The third type involved some (non-heavy 
industry) sectors that were left to be managed by private enterprises. 
The combined effect of these government regulations on industry was that they 
ultimately required firms to obtain a government license “to start a business, expand 
it or even to change its product range,” which significantly increased the costs of 
doing business for Indian firms (McKern & Denend, 2005, p. 4). Firms would face 
the regulatory burden of “armies of untrained bureaucrats” examining for months 
the firms’ license applications, often rejecting them for “ad hoc reasons” (McKern & 
Denend, 2005, p. 4). These excessive regulations stifled product market innovation and 
entrepreneurship to the point that obtaining “licenses became more important than 
the underlying products or services that they permitted” (Nobrega & Sinha, 2008, 
p. xv), with political skills at obtaining licenses functioning as a barrier to entry and as 
a competitive advantage.
The Indian labor market was rigid prior to reforms in 1991. For example, labor 
unions, allowed by the Trade Union Act of 1926, had dominated in virtually all 
industrial negotiations (Pellissery, 2008, p. 12). This reduced the labor market flexibility 
for employers, especially when seasonal demand would intensify the need for worker 
redeployment. Labor market inflexibility increases once firms go beyond 50 employees, 
resulting in firms unwilling to directly expand their manufacturing workforce and, 
instead, hiring more contract labor (Economist, 2013). 
Prior to 1991, India also followed a policy of fixed exchange rates and government-
allocated foreign exchange, with restrictions on foreign currency capital transactions. 
Foreign investments were prohibited in many sectors. The focus of the government was 
to expand the banking services to “underbanked” sectors in the rural Indian economy 
such as, e.g., agriculture, and maintain control over the interest rates (Kotwal, 2011, 
p. 1159). 
In sum, while India’s “policy framework was considered by most observers at the 
time to be socialist in its main thrust” (Desai & Bhagwati, 1975, p. 216), it also differed 
from the CEE countries’ Soviet Communist model in several key ways, as synthesized 
in Table 1. For instance, India allowed the development of the private sector, albeit 
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entrepreneurs faced the high burden of the License Raj system. However, the key goal 
of this “licensing machinery” was not just to regulate industrial production; “it was 
also considered necessary as an instrument for preventing the concentration of wealth 
and economic power within a limited number of large Industrial Houses in the private 
sector” (Desai & Bhagwati, 1975, p. 214). The Indian government also did not aim to 
nationalize existing companies, but to limit the new capital investments in the private 
sector. India also preserved its democratic system during the process. Furthermore, 
while the commanding heights of the economy were reserved for the government to 
expend capital to develop the steel and heavy industry typical for Soviet economies, 
the reason this occurred in India was “quite aside from ideological reasons” common in 
the Soviet economies: “it was difficult to persuade the private sector to invest in heavy 
industry and the public sector had to step in” (Desai & Bhagwati, 1975, p. 214). Thus, 
a key goal of the Indian version of Socialism was to achieve a long-term rise in people’s 
incomes and provide jobs for the unemployed through targeted state investments 
in order to overcome India’s poverty problem. As a result, India’s policy framework 
during its socialist period of development was of a mixed economy type: India’s non-
agricultural sectors were promoted by the government with heavy public investments 
and extensive licensing, while the agricultural sector was only modestly controlled. 
The Capitalist model of economic development in the post-1991 India
The capitalist period of economic development began in the emerging markets with 
the fall of the socialist regime and the start of pro-market reforms (Henisz et al., 2005; 
Williamson, 1990, 2004). In the CEE transition economies, this drastic institutional 
change occurred in the early 1990s when the countries abolished their communist 
regimes (for an overview of the transition to market in formerly communist countries, 
see Napier & Thomas, 2004). Developing countries around the world also implemented 
pro-market reforms. In India, in particular, the reforms began in 1991 (Chari & David, 
2012). 
Specifically, as part of its economic liberalization package, India introduced a new 
industrial policy shifting the country’s development to the market-based capitalist 
model of supply and demand. This included significant changes in the country’s 
economic and legal institutions that aimed to liberalize and stabilize the economy 
(McKern & Denend, 2005). Accordingly, India introduced various pro-market reforms 
in its product and factor markets that aimed to bring India closer to the advanced 
countries’ level of capitalist development.
For instance, after 1991, India lifted many of its former product market restrictions 
imposed by the License Raj. It significantly decreased its tariff barriers to foreign 
imports (Kotwal et al., 2011, p. 1157; OECD, 2007). Additionally, while 99% of the 
consumer goods imports were subject to non-tariff barriers during 1980-1985, that 
ratio has been declining dramatically after reforms to 46% during 1991-1995 and to 
33% during 1996-2000 (Kotwal, 2011, p. 1158). Price controls were also abolished in 
58 
the early 1990s in key industries. Additionally, the government deregulated most of 
the industries that were reserved for the public sector during the License Raj period 
(Kotwal, 2011, p. 1159).
India liberalized its labor markets too. For instance, in 2001, the Indian government 
amended the Trade Union Law to limit the influence and interference of outside 
political interests in the union. The amendment stipulated that all office bearers of the 
union should be employed in the establishment (Pellissery, 2008). India also reformed 
its capital markets by lifting many of its former capital market restrictions. For instance, 
while the maximum foreign equity ownership of an Indian company, prior to the reform, 
was capped at 40%, it was lifted to 51% in 1991 and later to 100%. Many previously 
closed sectors were now opened to foreign direct investment. 
3. Marketing Strategies of Local Companies Operating Under Different 
Economic Development Models 
Srivastava, Shervani & Fahey (1998) suggest that marketing strategy is concerned with 
developing and managing market based assets – relational and intellectual – so as to 
increase shareholder value. Relational assets are defined as extending to “key external 
stakeholders including distributors, retailers, end customers, strategic partners, 
community groups and even governmental agencies” (Srivastava et al., 1998, p. 5). 
Intellectual assets are knowledge that the firm develops about the environment (e.g., 
market conditions, customers, competitors, channels, suppliers, and social and political 
interest groups). Thus, customer, channel, and partner relationships are all key aspects 
of a company’s marketing strategy. Hanssens, Rust, & Srivastava (2009) show that 
customer equity and brand valuation are two important drivers of the firm’s value. Luo 
& Bhattacharya (2009) further demonstrate that advertising and R&D strategy are two 
strategic marketing levers. Luo (2008) found that marketing creates shareholder value, 
with this effect enhanced when firms have superior cost reduction efficiency. 
Earlier research studied marketing capability broadly, with marketing capability 
representing “a firm’s ability to understand and forecast customer needs better than 
its competitors and to effectively link its offerings to customers (market sensing 
and customer-linking capabilities; Day 1994)” (Krasnikov & Jayachandran, 2008, 
p. 1). Indeed, Kumar et al. (2011) found that market orientation had a positive 
effect on business performance in both the short-term and the long-term, and this 
sustained advantage in business performance was greater for firms that developed 
market orientation early in their existence. Thus, marketing strategy can be seen 
as encompassing capabilities and actions concerning customers, suppliers, and 
distribution channel relationships. It focuses on developing and managing marketing 
assets such as customer equity, brand valuation, and R&D assets, which can facilitate 
new product development.
As markets develop, local companies begin to develop a market orientation (the 
ability to focus on customers and competitors, and coordinate across functions) (Narver 
 59
T
AB
LE
 2
: A
 S
T
YL
IZ
ED
 C
O
M
PA
R
IS
O
N
 O
F 
M
AR
K
ET
IN
G
 S
T
RA
T
EG
IE
S 
U
N
D
ER
 S
O
C
IA
LI
ST
 A
N
D
 C
AP
IT
AL
IS
T
 M
O
D
EL
S 
O
F 
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 
D
EV
EL
O
PM
EN
T
 IN
 E
M
ER
G
IN
G
 M
AR
K
ET
S
SO
C
IA
LI
SM
C
A
PI
TA
LI
SM
So
vi
et
 C
om
m
un
is
m
Fa
bi
an
 S
oc
ia
lis
m
K
ey
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
pr
em
is
e;
 
th
e p
re
se
nc
e o
f 
m
ar
ke
ts
M
ar
ke
tin
g w
as
 n
ot
 n
ee
de
d 
as
 th
e s
ta
te
 
w
as
 th
e p
rim
ar
y b
uy
er
 an
d 
su
pp
lie
r o
f 
co
m
pa
ny
 p
ro
du
ct
s; 
m
an
ag
er
s 
la
ck
ed
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
sk
ill
s 
Ba
la
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
St
at
e-
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
in
du
s-
tr
ie
s, 
an
d 
pr
iv
at
e s
ec
to
r; 
en
tr
y 
in
to
 in
du
st
ry
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 m
in
ist
rie
s, 
lic
en
se
s 
M
ar
ke
ts
 g
ro
w
in
g 
in
 im
po
rt
an
ce
, g
re
at
er
 s
pa
ce
 
fo
r 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
, 
ne
w
er
 i
nd
us
tr
ie
s 
(e
.g
., 
IT
) 
oft
en
 
fre
e 
of
 
st
at
e 
co
nt
ro
l; 
ex
pa
nd
in
g 
th
e 
co
ns
um
er
 b
as
e b
ot
h 
gl
ob
al
ly
 an
d 
lo
ca
lly
 
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
or
ie
nt
at
io
n
C
on
su
m
er
 c
ho
ic
es
 l
im
ite
d,
 u
nh
ee
d-
ed
; f
oc
us
 o
n 
m
ee
tin
g 
St
at
e 
ne
ed
s a
nd
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
ta
rg
et
s; 
co
ns
um
er
 p
ro
d-
uc
ts
 o
f l
ow
er
 im
po
rt
an
ce
 
In
du
st
ria
l m
ar
ke
ts
 f
av
or
ed
 o
ve
r 
co
ns
um
er
 
m
ar
ke
ts
; s
om
e a
tte
nt
io
n 
to
 co
ns
um
er
 n
ee
ds
, 
aff
or
da
bi
lit
y, 
lo
w
-in
co
m
e 
co
ns
um
er
s; 
st
re
ss
 
co
ns
um
er
 st
ap
le
s, 
pr
ic
e c
on
tro
ls
G
ro
w
in
g 
m
id
dl
e 
cl
as
s, 
gr
ea
te
r m
at
er
ia
lis
m
, c
on
-
su
m
er
ism
; 
gr
ea
te
r 
aw
ar
en
es
s 
of
 n
ew
 p
ro
du
ct
s 
&
 te
ch
no
lo
gy
, i
nc
re
as
ed
 c
om
pe
tit
io
n 
(F
D
I a
nd
 
im
po
rt
s)
; 
att
en
tio
n 
to
 n
ew
 s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s 
(e
.g
., 
co
m
m
un
ity
 &
 m
ed
ia)
In
no
va
tio
n,
 
pr
od
uc
t 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
&
 p
ro
du
ct
 li
ne
 
br
ea
dt
h
In
no
va
tio
n 
at
 th
e 
se
rv
ic
e 
of
 th
e 
St
at
e;
 
fo
cu
s o
n 
de
fe
ns
e 
pr
ep
ar
ed
ne
ss
, h
ea
vy
 
in
du
st
ry
In
no
va
tio
n 
at
 b
ot
h 
st
at
e 
an
d 
la
rg
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
fir
m
s, 
st
at
e-
sp
on
so
re
d 
R&
D
 
flo
w
in
g 
to
 
in
du
st
ry
, 
im
ita
tio
n 
of
 f
or
ei
gn
 t
ec
hn
ol
og
y, 
pr
od
uc
ts
Im
ita
tio
n 
an
d 
ad
ap
ta
tio
n 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
ts
; i
nc
re
as
ed
 R
&
D
 in
 p
riv
at
e 
se
ct
or
, 
R&
D
 p
ar
tn
er
sh
ip
s w
ith
 fo
re
ig
n 
fir
m
s, 
sp
ill
ov
er
s, 
pr
oc
es
s &
 re
ve
rs
e i
nn
ov
at
io
n
Br
an
di
ng
 &
 
ad
ve
rt
is
in
g
C
ou
nt
ry
 b
ra
nd
 f
oc
us
, 
pa
tr
io
tic
 a
p-
pe
al
s; 
tra
de
d 
m
os
tly
 w
ith
 o
th
er
 S
ov
ie
t 
co
un
tr
ie
s 
an
d 
so
m
e 
W
es
te
rn
 c
ou
n-
tr
ie
s t
o 
ob
ta
in
 h
ar
d 
cu
rr
en
ci
es
 
St
at
e-
ow
ne
d 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
br
an
di
ng
, b
us
in
es
s 
gr
ou
p 
br
an
di
ng
, s
om
e 
co
ns
um
er
 b
ra
nd
in
g 
of
 st
ap
le
s-
 b
as
ic
 fo
od
s, 
to
ile
tr
ie
s, 
te
xt
ile
s
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 b
ra
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t, 
in
 sy
nc
hr
on
ic
ity
 
w
ith
 g
ro
w
th
  o
f n
ew
 m
ed
ia
 (
e.g
., 
T
V,
 In
te
rn
et
, 
so
ci
al
 m
ed
ia)
; b
ra
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t f
or
 o
ve
rs
ea
s 
m
ar
ke
ts
 to
 w
ith
st
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
br
an
ds
 en
tr
y
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
ch
an
ne
ls
 &
 
lo
gi
st
ic
s
U
nd
er
-d
ev
el
op
ed
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n 
ch
an
-
ne
ls 
an
d 
ph
ys
ic
al
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e;
 S
ta
te
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t t
o 
im
pr
ov
e 
ph
ys
ic
al
 in
fra
-
st
ru
ct
ur
e
St
at
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
ph
ys
ic
al
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e 
(e
.g
., 
ro
ad
s, 
po
rt
s, 
ra
il)
; i
m
pr
ov
ed
 d
ist
rib
u-
tio
n 
to
 ru
ra
l a
re
as
 an
d 
ex
po
rt
s
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 g
ro
w
th
 in
 p
hy
sic
al
 in
fra
st
ru
ct
ur
e, 
in
 
ch
an
ne
l d
ep
th
, k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
br
ea
dt
h,
 in
cl
ud
-
in
g o
nl
in
e r
et
ai
lin
g &
 e-
co
m
m
er
ce
; r
ise
 o
f s
up
er
-
m
ar
ke
ts
, b
ig
-b
ox
 st
or
es
, h
yp
er
m
ar
ke
ts
M
ar
ke
tin
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
&
 
pl
an
ni
ng
St
at
e 
ag
en
ci
es
, 
m
in
ist
rie
s, 
in
du
st
ry
 
de
pa
rt
m
en
ts
La
rg
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
 w
ith
 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
kn
ow
ho
w,
 
hu
m
an
 
re
so
ur
ce
s, 
m
ar
ke
tin
g 
bu
dg
et
s, 
co
m
pl
em
en
tin
g 
SO
Es
R
ise
 o
f l
ea
rn
in
g 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
ns
, p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
liz
a-
tio
n 
of
 m
ar
ke
tin
g 
ac
tiv
ity
, g
ro
w
th
 o
f s
pe
ci
al
ize
d 
m
ar
ke
tin
g  
se
rv
ic
e p
ro
vi
de
rs
 (e
.g
., e
xp
or
t t
ra
di
ng
 
ho
us
es
), 
ad
ve
rt
isi
ng
 ag
en
ci
es
, 3
rd
 p
ar
ty
 lo
gi
st
ic
s
So
ur
ce
s u
se
d 
fo
r t
he
 ta
bl
e:
 D
as
G
up
ta
 &
 D
att
a 
(2
00
4)
, D
es
ai
 &
 B
ha
gw
at
i (
19
75
), 
G
up
ta
 &
 N
ee
la
 R
ad
hi
ka
 (2
00
4)
, H
am
ilt
on
 (1
98
6)
, H
ur
t e
t a
l. 
(2
00
0)
, 
Sh
in
kl
e &
 K
ria
uc
iu
na
s (
20
12
), 
So
o 
(2
00
8)
, a
nd
 T
er
ps
tra
 &
 S
ar
at
hy
 (2
00
0)
. F
D
I s
ta
nd
s f
or
 fo
re
ig
n 
di
re
ct
 in
ve
st
m
en
t.
60 
& Slater 1990; Slater & Narver 1994). Hence, there is likely to be a positive correlation 
between the degree of economic development of an emerging market and the value of 
marketing used by the local companies from these emerging markets. The reason is that 
marketing becomes a powerful differentiation capability for firms to counter the free 
entry of rivals into the industry, withstand the more dynamic interplay between supply 
and demand, and meet the growing consumer expectations for better quality products. 
We next describe some key marketing strategies that local companies from emerging 
markets used while operating under each model of economic development in their 
countries.  Table 2 summarizes these different marketing strategies, grouped by the 
different models of economic development in the emerging markets.
Marketing strategies of local companies under Soviet Communism in the pre-1990s 
CEE transition economies 
Prior to the start of pro-market reforms in the early 1990s, the CEE transition 
economies suffered from underdeveloped market systems that created excess capacity 
and shortages and prevented creative destruction (Vichas,1994). As most enterprises 
were state-controlled, the emergence of new businesses and new products was 
discouraged by the State, although some smaller private shops and entrepreneurs did 
exist (Malnight & Moncef, 2007). Competition was generally limited and constrained, 
which promoted the creation of monopolies (or oligopolies) with strong Party ties 
(Hurt et al., 2000; Peng & Luo 2000). Distribution was also difficult due to physical 
infrastructure shortcomings, compounded by the fact that most companies preferred 
the state-owned distributors to the smaller entrepreneurial companies (Malnight & 
Moncef, 2007). 
Product innovation was discouraged by the State as it was considered to stifle the 
fulfilment of the State production plan and quotas by the enterprises (Hurt et al., 
2000). Indeed, “new product development had little relation with market research but 
was rather production-driven” (Hurt et al., 2000, p. 6). Most innovation efforts and 
expenditures emanated from government and state-sponsored research institutions and 
labs, with an emphasis on State needs, such as defense preparedness, heavy industry, and 
manufacturing processes. Consequently, enterprises had little connection with the end 
consumer, leaving limited product choices and chronic shortages. A related problem was 
“a lack of familiarity with Western market needs and, even more, a conceptual framework 
for utilizing that knowledge”. Drawing on studies of Hungarian firms such as Budaprint, 
a state-owned textile enterprise, Gedeon Richter, a state-owned pharmaceutical firm in 
the process of being privatized, Müszertechnika, a privately owned firm engaged in the 
manufacture of computers and electrical equipment, and Szim, a state-owned firm in 
the machine-tools sector, both before and after the start of pro-market reforms, it was 
suggested that a lack of strategic thinking that would combine market analysis and an 
understanding of the firm’s competitive advantages was a key weakness (Brada, Singh 
& Torok, 1994). 
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Thus, companies operating under Soviet Communism did not have to pursue 
aggressive marketing strategies in their domestic markets as the State was the primary 
supplier and buyer of the products. Companies had limited knowledge of how to 
do market research, as well as limited motivation to seek additional consumers, or 
make better quality products and packaging (Hurt et al., 2000). Quality standards 
for products were also not common (Vichas, 1994) and the number of locations to 
buy products or services was also limited (Ismakova & Roberts, 1998). Additionally, 
companies often had one product only: e.g., Eris, the Polish-based cosmetics company, 
“had one employee and produced one cream” in 1983 (Malnight & Moncef, 2007, 
p. 3). Companies also typically did not have a marketing or sales department as the State 
considered production and administration to be the key positions in a company: “there 
was simply a person waiting for pick-up sales—everybody else was in administration or 
production” (Hurt et al., 2000, p. 21). The typical “second in command” was the technical 
director, “a further evidence of the primacy of production” (Vichas, 1994, p. 6). 
Accordingly, many enterprises operating under Soviet Communism did not 
appreciate the needs of regular (non-State) consumers to a point where it became 
common to perceive of the customer as “the one who came to ‘beg’” to the enterprise 
to produce enough for everyone (Hurt et al., 2000, p. 25). The government would 
provide the customers; e.g., in the case of Hotel ‘Uzbekistan’, the government could 
ensure high occupancy rates: Hotel Uzbekistan’s core customers prior to 1991 were 
tourists from Eastern Europe (Ismakova & Roberts, 1998). Local companies were also 
not used to facilitating the commercial exchanges with their customers. For instance, 
in Hotel Uzbekistan, there were different procedures adopted depending on whether 
the customer paid cash or with a credit card. Paying in cash was more difficult as the 
customer had to first change the hard currency into local currency “at an approved 
branch of the State Bank” and obtain a certificate proving legal exchange, without 
which the payment could not be processed (Ismakova & Roberts, 1998, p. 3). Hotel 
Uzbekistan was among the few places where credit cards were accepted, so customers 
preferred this payment option, increasing the hotel’s occupancy rates. 
An additional problem companies had during Soviet Communism was that their 
countries’ currency was inconvertible (Hamilton, 1986).  To obtain hard Western 
currency such as Deutsche Marks or British Pounds, such companies had to export to 
the West. This put severe pressures on companies like Siauliai Factory of Nonwoven 
Fabrics from Lithuania, which could not afford to purchase necessary equipment for 
production from the West. “Hard currency earned from exports could buy imports 
from Western countries” (Vichas, 1994, p. 5). A further problem with this approach 
was the limited demand in the West for Soviet-made goods due to their generally lower-
quality than their Western-made counterparts. Under these circumstances, barter and 
countertrade became important modes of operation (Cohen & Zysman, 1986).
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Marketing strategies of local companies under Fabian Socialism in pre-1991 India
There were significant marketing challenges that Indian companies faced prior to 
the start of pro-market reforms in 1991. As Table 1 showed, a key feature of Fabian 
Socialism was the emphasis on the collective and community goals and the eradication 
of poverty and social injustice. Thus, Indian companies operating during this period 
were also “imprinted” (Kriauciunas & Kale, 2006, p. 660) by these community goals 
such that they adopted marketing strategies developing affordable products aimed at 
the mass market, which  would allow the firms to not only sell to consumers but also 
alleviate poverty, in line with the socialist economic goals of the period. 
For this purpose, Indian companies had to adapt and devise creative strategies to 
reach the underserved rural population in remote Indian villages. As far back as 1983, 
CavinKare, a leading cosmetics company in India, identified rural markets in India 
as its key growth opportunity. A key challenge was poor infrastructure, including 
communications media availability, which hindered efficient access to consumers in 
rural areas. To reach remote consumers in these villages, CavinKare had to purchase 
radio advertising spots featuring its shampoo products, on radio stations that played 
popular tunes whose frequencies reach and could be heard in the villages with potential 
customers (Gupta & Neela Radhika, 2004). 
An additional challenge that Indian companies had to overcome prior to the start 
of reforms was the lack of sophistication of their potential consumers. “The average 
consumer lacked sophistication; cloth was sold by the yard, tea leaves by the kilo, and 
soap was cut into chunks to be sold by weight” (Datta, 1997, p. 3). Rural consumers 
in India in the early 1980s were not as accustomed yet as their urban counterparts to 
using liquid shampoo for their washing needs (rural consumers preferred the hard soap 
bars) but were open to shampoo “as long as it was within their means” (Gupta & Neela 
Radhika, 2004, p. 4). Hence, to supplement the radio spots, CavinKare showed two-
minute clips of the benefits from using shampoo during intervals at popular movie 
screenings for these rural and small town citizens, so as  to educate consumers about 
how to use the shampoo products. 
Another barrier was the meager discretionary income of poor consumers, especially 
in rural areas. Accordingly, CavinKare conducted a survey across Indian villages to 
identify the number of households where people washed their hair at least once a week. 
Based on this research, they began offering 1 free shampoo sachet for every 5 empty ones 
to such consumers. These marketing strategies helped CavinKare gain appeal among its 
customers and capture more than 50% of the underserved rural Indian market by 1990.
In other sectors of the economy, other Indian companies were also trying to help 
citizens achieve their social and economic goals for their families. For instance, as farmers 
were considered “the spine of nation’s democracy” (Gupta & Neela Radhika, 2004, 
p. 2), the agricultural sector was another area for important marketing innovations to 
help farmers become more self-reliant and to reach the underserved population. Prior 
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to the start of reforms, Indian farming was fragmented and suffered from exploitation 
from numerous strong middlemen along the distribution channel. To prevent the 
continuous selling of their perishable milk products to the strong middlemen at rock-
bottom prices, the Indian farmers decided to unite resources and market their own 
products by forming a milk union in 1946, popularly known as AMUL. They also 
decided collectively to supply milk to the Bombay Milk Scheme to guarantee a ready 
market and incentivize more farmers to join AMUL. The farmers also collectively 
decided to share a portion of the year-end profits as patronage bonus to their highest-
quantity producers.
AMUL was collectively owned, operated, and controlled by the farmers who needed 
only pay a small entrance fee and commit to sell their surplus milk (after meeting 
their families’ needs) to the union. AMUL consisted of village societies (producing 
and collecting milk), district milk union (procuring technical inputs), and the milk 
federation (marketing milk). Specifically, the milk federation “helped to enhance 
the role of a consumer in the buying process” and prevented consumers from being 
exposed to milk shortages, high milk prices, lower quality milk, and unethical practices 
by middlemen (Gupta & Neela Radhika, 2004, p. 6). AMUL engaged also in backward 
integration (by bringing in better quality veterinary and husbandry practices) and 
forward integration – invested to build a plant to produce milk powder and butter - 
thus providing better quality and variety of milk products at more affordable prices 
to the consumers. As a result, “coordination and cooperation across the ethnic and 
social strata for a common cause helped in the eradication of many social inequalities” 
in India (Gupta & Neela Radhika, 2004, p. 6). Such initiatives also created jobs and 
ensured employment and substantial income for many poor people in India. They also 
promoted the role of women in the economy.
Marketing strategies of local companies under Capitalism in post-1991 India
A fundamental issue marking the transition from socialism to capitalism is whether 
markets emerge and are allowed to develop, replacing State-governed allocation 
mechanisms. The advent of pro-market reforms necessitates the creation of strong 
marketing capabilities by the emerging market firms to withstand the growing 
competition, both from foreign and domestic rivals. Thus, both post-communist 
and developing country companies begin to actively seek to understand and satisfy 
customer needs using a variety of marketing strategies: e.g., innovation, new product 
development and product adaptation, promotion and communication (Golden et al., 
1995). 
Emerging market companies started using new digital infrastructure and social 
media to reach the end consumer faster. For instance, Yandex, incorporated in 2004, 
is a search engine in Russia that generated 63.3% of all search traffic in Russia as of 
December 2011 by offering national and international content tailored to a variety of 
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digital platforms (Reuters)2. Using a similar approach, EKO India Financial Services 
leveraged high mobile phone penetration rates in India to develop cell phone-based 
banking solutions for the vast unbanked population of India, helping achieve a national 
government objective (Gupta, 2013). A necessary element of successful marketing 
strategy is facilitating payments, which is difficult in countries such as India, where 59% 
of households lack bank accounts. EKO India Financial Services saw this as a business 
opportunity and attempted to overcome this basic financial infrastructure gap by 
creating and facilitating a system of payment and collection through mobile phones, 
using a nationwide system of agents to allow individuals separated by vast distances to 
make and receive payments from one another via mobile phones, often in rural areas, 
with the amounts then easily withdrawn from any State Bank of India ATM. Developing 
countries as a group face the same problem, and only a few successful mobile payments 
systems have emerged – M-Pesa in Kenya, G-Cash and Smart Money in the Philippines, 
Vodacom in Tanzania, with each country’s specific situation requiring a somewhat 
different solution. EKO had to develop a solution that could work across ten different 
mobile network operators in India, and meet the  Indian government’s requirement 
that a bank be involved in the payment transaction (unlike Kenya which has allowed 
Safaricom, the mobile network operator, to take on some banking functions). 
India has become well-known as a software exporter and firms such as HCL India 
are a good illustration of how both relationships and knowledge-based marketing assets 
can be deployed to good effect in overseas markets. HCL developed and offered multiple 
modes to provide IT outsourcing and custom software development to its overseas 
clients (Loveman & O’Connell, 1996). First, HCL used a “body shop” approach, in 
which HCL personnel were sent overseas to work as contract labor at client premises 
in overseas locations, developing and delivering the requested software, with HCL 
receiving fees and paying its employees assigned to temporary overseas postings at client 
sites. Second, HCL allowed clients to contract with HCL to develop software, but with 
the development carried out at the client’s preferred geographic locations, often in the 
client’s home country and city offices. This required HCL to set up overseas subsidiaries 
and development sites at various cities where its major clients were located. Third, the 
lowest-cost alternative, where clients contract with HCL and allow HCL to develop 
software offshore, in India, using HCL personnel paid at Indian salary scales, typically 
less than half of a developed country pay scales. However, productivity could be lower, 
and supervision and coordination costs could be higher, with cultural differences and 
geographic distance affecting quality and customer satisfaction. 
Similarly, the start of pro-market reforms led to more opportunities for developing 
e-commerce marketing capabilities in Indian companies. For instance, ITC, one of 
India’s largest consumer product and agricultural business companies, created internet-
2 Source: http://www.reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyProfile?rpc=66&symbol=YNDX.O. Accessed 
March 30, 2014.
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enabled kiosks called e-chopal placed in farmers’ villages to help the farmers search 
for competitive prices and share product information with their various distribution 
channel partners (DasGupta & Dutta, 2004; Vachani & Smith, 2008). While there were 
only 6 e-chopal kiosks in India in 2000, the number grew to 1,200 by 2002 (DasGupta & 
Dutta, 2004). Such innovative marketing initiatives created a direct marketing channel 
for the farmers by eliminating the need for channel intermediaries, who would often 
conceal important pricing information from both channel ends and “cream off a higher 
profit margin for themselves” (DasGupta & Dutta, 2004, p. 8). Thus, the development 
of such e-commerce marketing capabilities helped reduce logistics costs and increased 
profitability and growth for the Indian farmers.
Greater pro-market reforms also enabled rising access to education in India, which 
in turn enabled some consumers, especially those living in urban areas, to begin 
appreciating and demand higher quality products. This created market segmentation 
opportunities for the Indian companies. Cargill India was one such company that 
sought to market to both industrial (B2B) and consumer markets. While traditionally 
a supplier to large institutional buyers, Cargill India decided to target the consumer 
market, developing a line of branded vegetable oils, tomato products and other food 
items, to take advantage of a younger population segment with rising incomes. Cargill 
India decided to focus on selling to consumers in India, as a way of reducing their 
exposure to government price regulations and the volatility of commodity prices. 
Larger consumer sales would help increase factory capacity utilization in its edible 
oil processing plants. To achieve this changed strategy, it acquired Indian edible oil 
processing firms, developed additional brands in cooking oils, sunflower oil, and 
palm oil, and launched related products such as processed tomato products (Pirouz & 
Chandrasekhar, 2013).
In another example, using price based segmentation, CavinKare developed two 
types of products for its less and more affluent customers: single-use sachets priced 
at 50 paise per unit for the price-conscious consumers and more sophisticated 50 ml 
shampoo bottles priced at Rs 6 for the more quality-focused consumers. The company 
also offered shampoo bottles for bulk buying as an alternative affordable option. 
CavinKare also started expanding into holistic and herbal products for hair dye that 
gave natural color and nourished the hair. The company advertised specifically the “no 
harmful side effects” of the product, catering particularly for a new consumer segment, 
healthy lifestyle conscious consumers. In 1998, CavinKare entered the perfume market 
as well, making the perfume available in 4 variations (Mist, Wood, Dusk, and Storm) 
after extensive market research on over 300 variations of fragrances. It made the 
perfume available in “dab-on packs” (Gupta & Neela Radhika, 2004, p. 6) priced at Rs 
10, the lowest price on the market in India. This marketing campaign was specifically 
targeted at the lower- and middle-income consumer segment, which was not the focus 
of foreign competition. CavinKare also entered the deodorant and talcum powder 
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markets targeting the urban youth market with Fun, Freedom, and Magic single-use 
sachet scents. By 2003, CavinKare expanded further by diversifying into the food and 
detergent business with new creative product offerings: it started selling pickles in 
sachets and dish washer bars.
As the capitalist model of economic development settles as the new market reality 
in emerging markets, competition intensifies. This creates the need for the emerging 
market companies to diversify their product line portfolios and increase their product 
line breadth. Ajanta Packaging, a major Indian glass-bottle manufacturing company 
with leading market share was faced with this product diversification imperative 
(Puri, 2014). Ninety percent of Ajanta’s revenue came from repeat customers, and 
this repeat business was being threatened by newer, cheaper and environmentally as 
well as aesthetically more attractive substitutes such as PET bottles, Tetra Pak cartons 
and flexible foam packaging. Ajanta needed to develop industry-specific customer 
segmentation strategies, such as developing PET bottles and packaging for the 
pharmaceutical industry and for the shampoo, and toiletries segments of fast moving 
consumer goods.
These changes do not reduce the attention paid to bottom of the pyramid customers 
in India. For instance, Godrej Chotukool, one of India’s largest consumer durable 
goods producers, was launching an unconventional alternative to refrigerators, aimed 
at the “bottom of the pyramid” (BOP), operating on a 12 volt battery, and priced at 
about half of the price of the lowest-priced refrigerator. Since 80% of Indian consumers 
did not own refrigerators, Godrej had to target these non-consumers, while thinking 
about distributing the product to rural consumers through NGOs, as opposed to 
using traditional refrigerator distribution channels, balancing the likely higher cost and 
possible inefficiencies of using NGOs against their greater reach and familiarity with 
the target rural BOP segment (Dhanraj, Suram, &Vemuri, 2011). 
The market-opening reforms that create opportunities for the local companies also 
intensify competition at home, from new domestic firms. We earlier cited the successful 
rise of the AMUL cooperative dairy group. With pro-market reforms in India, these 
cooperatives have begun to face significant competition from private enterprises. 
For example, since the early 1980s, the Bihar State Milk Cooperative Federation 
(COMPFED) had been marketing dairy products gathered from about 4000 village 
cooperatives. Rising competition from private firms who were offering higher payments 
to some farmers, coupled with shortages of milk supply due to floods and other 
environmental factors, began forcing COMPFED to re-examine its marketing strategy, 
from milk procurement, to cost of service delivery, to dairy product pricing, and the 
choice of distribution channels. To avoid losing dairy suppliers to the newer private 
firms, it had to persuade its farmer-suppliers of the value of long-run sustainability 
fostered by the cooperatives’ efforts (Adhikari & Jha, 2012). We next discuss the 
implications of our findings.
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4. Discussion, Future Research Venues, and Conclusion
We presented a stylized comparison between two broad models of economic de-
velopment in emerging markets: socialism and capitalism. We specifically distin-
guished between two types of socialist economic development: Soviet communism 
(as experienced, e.g., in the pre-1990s CEE transition economies) and Fabian so-
cialism (as experienced, e.g., in pre-1991 India). We then analyzed the marketing stra-
tegies of companies from emerging markets operating under these different models 
of economic development. While the general thrust is in the direction of pro-market 
liberalization, Staehr (2011) notes that for several smaller Eastern European countries, 
democratic reforms have been implemented at the expense of market-oriented eco-
nomic reform; the implication is that while reforms have regulated and attempted to 
unify markets across borders within the enlarged European Union, there has been less 
market-economic reform. 
While our focus was specifically on the marketing strategies of CEE transition 
economies and India, as key representatives of emerging markets, future research can 
extend our ideas in several new directions and broader contexts. For instance, future 
studies can analyze the marketing strategies of other developing countries such as, 
e.g., China, which is also a transition economy but not post-communist yet. China is 
yet to reform its political system to the extent that the CEE countries did after they 
abolished communism. Thus, it would be interesting for future research to analyze if 
and how emerging market companies based in the countries that have reformed both 
politically and economically differ from their counterparts based in the countries that 
have reformed primarily economically in terms of their marketing strategies. 
More research is also needed to understand the marketing strategies of other non-
transition developing countries beyond India, e.g., countries in Africa, Latin America, 
or the Middle East, which have also experienced their own versions of socialism 
(Heilperin, 1960; Rapley, 1996). For instance, recent research has emphasized the need 
to study the reverse innovation strategies of emerging market companies aiming to enter 
developed country markets (Govindarajan & Trimble, 2012; Govindarajan & Euchner, 
2012). Hang, Chen, & Subramian (2010) report on such reverse innovation strategies 
at several Asian emerging market firms, noting the advantages arising from being forced 
to consider dominant characteristics of emerging market consumers such as their 
affordability constraints and the resulting innovation efforts addressed at improving 
price-performance ratios so as to better serve the  mass markets in these nations. 
Obtaining sustainable competitive advantage from marketing strategy is often facilitated 
when complemented with related strategies such as cost efficiency. Stojcic, Hashi, & 
Telhaj (2013) found that market share of firms in transition economies was positively 
related to restructuring behavior that included improvements in  cost efficiency, labor 
productivity, investment and increasing experience.  Kaufmann & Roesch (2012) note 
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that the level of motivation, opportunity and ability can all constrain emerging market 
firms as they attempt to ratchet up their marketing efforts, leading some firms to rely on 
low-cost advantage alone in place of also building up marketing capabilities.  
As firms in these liberalizing emerging economies become more adept at marketing, 
they will naturally seek to extend their competitive advantage into foreign markets, 
and several interesting research questions arise surrounding the choice of locations 
for international marketing efforts. For example, Radlo (2012) found that Polish firm 
marketing strategies had evolved through two phases, with home market success and 
learning leading to regional expansion into neighboring Central and Eastern European 
countries, often using equity-based modes of entry.  Furthermore, while we focused 
on the marketing strategies of home-grown emerging market companies, future 
research may extend our reseach by analyzing the marketing endeavors of advanced 
country companies entering the emerging markets. For instance, Kwon (2010), in a 
study comparing the performance of Korean subsidiaries in India and China, found 
that actions such as developing and maintaining networks with suppliers, customers, 
distributors and government authorities helped the Korean subsidiaries understand 
local customers better. Thus, it would be interesting to study if local or foreign 
companies can meet domestic consumers’ needs better. For example, some emerging 
market firms face difficulties in brand building because of negative country of origin 
effects (Guzman & Paswan, 2009). The role of cultural brands has been suggested as a 
possible way to counteract such negative country of origin effects as it builds the brand 
around the group’s cultural identity, myths, roots, and future aspirations, which may be 
better appreciated by the group’s consumers (Guzman & Paswan, 2009). 
Within-country regional differences in marketing strategies can also be analyzed 
by future research. For instance, some recent advances in this area suggest that there 
are significant regional differences in brand perceptions in Russia. Residents in St. 
Petersburg were more receptive than Moscow residents to corporate endorsements as an 
indicator of quality, while residents of Moscow regarded international (market) success 
as more indicative of a brand’s quality relative to St. Petersburg residents ( Jakubanecs 
& Supphellen, 2010). Future research can examine other factors in such regional brand 
perceptions beyond differences in economic and consumer culture development. 
Improvements in media infrastructure and the growing ubiquity of mobile phones 
across emerging markets provide an additional avenue for brand building, using social 
media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube to create consumer communities which 
can through peer support share product experiences and collectively enhance product 
utility, benefiting individual firms in their customer orientation and differentiation 
efforts (Berthon et al., 2012; Kaplan & Haenlein, 2010).  There may also be regional 
convergence taking place, alongside regional differences. Kholodilin, Oshchepkov, & 
Siliverstovs (2012) point out that within Russia, there is strong regional convergence 
among high-income regions located near other high-income regions, while the overall 
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speed of regional convergence is slow, with implications for adapting marketing 
strategies within Russia, by regional profiles.  
Overcoming channel inadequacies and underdeveloped physical distribution 
infrastructure may offer additional promise for emerging market firms in their market 
orientation drive. Under such conditions, both business and political ties may have 
to be deployed to raise channel performance, as well as changing channel governance 
structure to   fit   distributors’ role orientation (Dong, Li, & Tse, 2013; Dong, Tse, & 
Hung, 2010). Further, emerging market firms could benefit from evolving their channel 
intermediary use and the intensity of channel intermediary use, in line with changing 
market and competitive conditions and with product life-cycle evolution (Low & 
Cheng, 2009).  
Lastly, more research is needed into how emerging market companies can develop 
productive consumers through marketing; i.e., consumers who not only spend their 
money on products but also become more constructive members of their communi-
ties (Letelier, Flores, & Spinosa, 2003). Letelier et al. (2003) suggest that companies 
can develop productive consumers by stressing not just product innovation, but also 
cross-selling, shared cultural values, customer retention, and involvement with com-
munity. For instance, Cemex’s Patrimonio Hoy aims to aid low-income consumers in 
building affordable homes at a sustainable pace in Mexico. Similarly, Grameen Bank is 
another salutary example of a company that helps develop productive consumers by 
using microfinance programs to support micro-enterprises by women in Bangladesh. 
In a similar vein, firms can benefit by educating their emerging market customers, so 
that they have a sound basis for judging product performance and assessing their satis-
faction as customers. For instance, Dou, Li, & Su (2010) found that knowledge asym-
metry, in both professional knowledge and local knowledge, affected the satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction of local clients of foreign advertising agencies, as it created goal in-
congruence, gaps in the goals set by local clients and as set by their advertising service 
providers. Customer support investments are another means of enhancing customer 
focus and consequently bolstering emerging market firm performance (Khavul et al., 
2010).
In sum, our study suggests that what can distinguish emerging market firms in 
their marketing adaptation to pro-market reforms is their ability to become learning 
organizations, closely tuned to the specific needs of the local consumers and adept at 
maneuvering within the structures and competitive forces of a capitalist economy. 
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